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ESSAYS 
A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE? AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASSET PROTECTION AND 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS UNDER VIRGINIA LAW 
Landon C. Davis III * 
Isaac A. McBeth ** 
Elizabeth Southall *** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“A distinction without a difference”—a colloquial expression 
employed by one wishing to recognize that while a linguistic or 
conceptual distinction exists between any number of options, any 
such distinction lacks substantive practical effect.
1
 To allege that 
a situation presents “a distinction without a difference” is to sug-
gest that any difference between a given set of options is a logical 
fallacy—purely a creature of erroneous perception.
2
 When it 
comes to concepts of asset protection planning and fraudulent 
transfer law, one must ask whether the law draws a distinction 
where there is no difference. 
* Associate, Parrish, Houck & Snead, PLC, Fredericksburg, Virginia. J.D., 2011,
University of Richmond School of Law; M.B.A., 2011, University of Richmond School of 
Business; B.S., 2008, University of Mary Washington. 
**  Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2011, University of 
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, American Military University. 
***  J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Univer-
sity of Virginia. 
1. Jessica Ellis, What Is a Distinction Without a Difference?, WISEGEEK, http://www.
wisegeek.com/what-is-a-distinction-without-a-difference.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
2. Id.
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Given the now longstanding economic downturn and the steady 
increase in Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings since 2009,
3
 it is neither 
uncommon nor unimaginable that an existing or potential client 
will seek assistance in either “asset protection planning” or 
“bankruptcy planning” services. These concepts tend to walk 
hand-in-hand,
4
 although an argument could be made that “asset 
protection planning” is more proactive in nature, while “bank-
ruptcy planning” is more reactive in nature. Such an argument 
notwithstanding, the desired end goal is the same—structure a 
client’s holdings so as to provide the client with the greatest secu-
rity from claims of existing or future creditors.
5
 
Fraudulent transfer law, however, is designed to achieve a 
completely contrary goal. It seeks to protect creditors by giving 
the court power to void a debtor’s transfer of assets when such a 
transfer operates to prevent a creditor from satisfying its claim 
against the debtor/transferor.
6
 Of course, fraudulent transfer law 
does not bar every movement of assets which may impact a credi-
tor’s likelihood of being fully compensated. Rather, under Virgin-
ia law, a “fraudulent transfer” is a movement of assets falling into 
one of two general categories: (i) transfers made by an insolvent 
debtor for inadequate consideration;
7
 and (ii) transfers made by a 
debtor with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
8
 
Although the law and the ethical rules governing its practice 
certainly recognize a distinction between “asset protection plan-
ning” and “fraudulent transfers,”
9
 they do little to identify the 
true difference between an intent to protect one’s assets as op-
3. 79% Increase in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Filers, PRLOG (July 31, 2009), http://www.
prlog.org/10297745-79-increase-in-chapter-7-bankruptcy-filers.html. 
4. See John E. Sullivan III, Asset Protection Plans & Bankruptcy: Some Possible Is-
sues, VMF0616 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 73, 114 (2005). 
5. See Jack E. Owen, Jr. & Bradley G. Korell, Joint Ownership of Property as a
Method of Asset Protection, in Duncan E. Osborne & Elizabeth M. Schurig, 1 ASSET 
PROTECTION: DOM. & INT’L L. & TACTICS § 12.55 (updated through April 2012); Keith S. 
Kromash, Fraudulent Transfers and Conversions and Ethical Considerations, ASSET 
PROTECTION IN FLORIDA § 1.25 (2d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter Kromash, Ethical Considera-
tions]. 
6. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012). “All states have laws to protect
creditors from fraudulent transfers.” Duncan E. Osborne & Elizabeth M. Schurig, What 
ACTEC Fellows Should Really Know About Asset Protection, in Frederick J. Tansill, Asset 
Protection Trusts (Apts): Non-Tax Issues, SR019 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 547, 651 n.2 (2009) [herein-
after Osborne, ACTEC Fellows]. 
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
8. Id. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
9. See infra Parts III and IV.
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posed to an intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.” Indeed, 
one could argue that any attempt to engage in asset protection 
necessarily contemplates an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
creditors (even though such creditors might be remote or unfore-
seeable).
10
 Conversely, a proponent of asset protection planning 
would argue the two are as different as night and day. 
Whatever perspective an individual adheres to, one thing is 
certain: there is a distinction. There is a legal distinction. Attor-
neys assisting their clients in valid asset protection planning re-
inforce the client’s long-term security, while attorneys assisting 
their clients in effecting fraudulent transfers may very well be 
harming their client’s long-term security. There is an ethical dis-
tinction. Attorneys assisting their clients in asset protection 
planning are fulfilling their ethical duty to represent their client 
skillfully and competently, while attorneys assisting their clients 
in effecting fraudulent transfers might violate a number of ethical 
rules. 
This essay identifies these distinctions. Part II provides a 
summary description of asset protection planning and the reason-
ing behind the same. It also provides a brief discussion of the 
substance of Virginia fraudulent transfer law and the potential 
legal effects such transfers may have on a client. More important-
ly, this essay embraces the unenviable task of enunciating the 
substantive legal and ethical difference between the two. Part III 
enumerates the factors an attorney can look to in determining 
whether a client’s desired goals are legitimate asset protection 
planning or fraudulent transfers. Part IV discusses the ethical 
implications of an attorney assisting a client in effecting asset 
protection planning and/or fraudulent transfers. Finally, Part V 
of this essay provides basic guidance for practitioners to follow in 
order to help identify ethically questionable situations prospec-
tively and deal with them accordingly. 
II. THE LEGAL DISTINCTION
Before it is possible to understand the substantive difference, if 
any, between asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers, 
10. See Kromash, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5 (“[I]t would appear that asset
protection planning is meant to deceive creditors and courts.”). 
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it is necessary to acknowledge and enunciate the legal distinction 
between these alternate perceptions of any given transfer.  
A.  Asset Protection Planning 
Asset protection planning generally refers to the process by 
which an individual or legal entity attempts to structure its as-
sets so as to minimize the risk that those assets may be used to 
satisfy any given present or future liability.
11
 Although practi-
tioners employ a wide variety of techniques to assist their clients 
in asset protection planning, they generally seek to minimize any 
given creditor’s ability to satisfy its claim with a debtor’s assets 
through one of two ways: (i) by shifting ownership of the assets 
into some “protected” form that still enables the debtor to make 
beneficial use of the assets;
12
 or (ii) by shifting “nonexempt” assets 
into an “exempt” asset class.
13
 Each of these techniques is ad-
dressed below. 
To understand what it means to shift assets from an unpro-
tected form of ownership to a protected form of ownership, it is 
worth briefly addressing what it means for an asset to be held in 
an “unprotected” form of ownership. An asset is “unprotected” 
when it is subject to the creditor process by creditors of the indi-
vidual or entity making use of the asset.
14
 The most obvious and 
common form of unprotected ownership is a natural born person 
or legal entity holding direct title to assets.
15
 For example, assets 
11. Barry S. Engel, Using Foreign Situs Trusts For Asset Protection Planning, 20 EST. 
PLAN. 212, 213 (1993) (“Asset protection planning is simply the process of organizing one’s 
assets in advance to safeguard them from loss or dissipation by reason of potential risks to 
which they would otherwise be subject.”). 
12. Jacob Stein, Practical Primer and Radical Approach To Asset Protection, 38 EST.
PLAN. 21, 26 (2011) [hereinafter Stein, Primer], (“The conceptual goal of all asset protec-
tion planning is two-fold: (1) remove the debtor’s name from the legal title to the assets, 
but (2) in such a way so that the debtor could retain some beneficial enjoyment and a de-
gree of control.”). 
13. Jeffrey A. Baskies, Recent Court Decision Highlights a Limit To Asset Protection
Planning, 37 EST. PLAN. 36, 36 (2010) (“Estate planners who must frequently navigate 
through asset protection issues know that most of the essential elements of asset protec-
tion planning lie in our state laws, specifically in statutory exemptions from creditors.”). 
14. See Paula Aiello & Eric K. Behrens, Student Loans, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, and the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 13 J.C. & U.L. 1, 3 n.12 (1986) (recognizing 
unprotected assets as those that are “non-exempt” in the context of bankruptcy). 
15. See Asset Protection & Risk Management Planning, MCGAUNN & SCHWADRON
CPA’S, LLC, http://www.mcgaunnschwadron.com/asset-protection-risk-management-plan 
ning/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
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owned by an individual typically are subject to attachment—i.e., 
creditors may use the judicial machinery to seize those assets and 
liquidate them to satisfy the creditors’ claims.
16
 Another form of 
ownership generally recognized as unprotected is when assets are 
held by a revocable living trust.
17
 Although, in such a situation, a 
trust technically holds the assets instead of the trust’s benefi-
ciary, the law generally allows the beneficiary’s creditors to reach 
the trust assets to satisfy creditors’ claims.
18
 
Conversely, holding assets in a “protected” form enables an in-
dividual or legal entity to make use of an asset while simultane-
ously placing the asset beyond the reach of creditors.
19
 Stereotypi-
cal asset protection planning of this variety involves transferring 
title of the assets to a form of legal entity owned by the debtor, 
such as corporations, limited partnerships, or limited liability 
companies.
20
 Moreover, transferring assets to certain forms of 
domestic or international trusts can serve a similar function.
21
 
One of the most common forms of protected ownership em-
ployed under Virginia law is real estate held as a tenancy by the 
entirety but purchased with individual assets.
22
 Property held by 
tenants by the entirety cannot be used to satisfy creditors’ claims 
against either spouse individually.
23
 Phrased alternatively, the 
only creditor capable of reaching property held as a tenancy by 
the entirety is a joint creditor of both husband and wife.
24
 Thus, 
by using individual funds to purchase assets owned as a tenancy 
16. See HOWARD L. OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 30 (1953).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.05 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
18. Id.
19. See Stein, Primer, supra note 12.
20. Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the
Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
831, 837 (1999). 
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951) (holding
that property held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is immunized from the 
claims of their individual creditors) (citation omitted); Burroughs v. Gorman, 166 Va. 58, 
59–60, 184 S.E. 174, 174 (1936) (same holding); Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 745–46, 149 
S.E. 615, 618 (1929) (same holding). A tenancy by the entirety is “limited to husbands and 
wives, who own the property as a unit, not by equal shares.” BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH 
SNOE, PROPERTY 225–28 (4th ed. 2012).  
23. Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1999) (“We have stated,
clearly and without equivocation, that real property held as tenants by the entireties is 
exempt from the claims of creditors who do not have joint judgments against the husband 
and wife.”) (citing Vasilion, 192 Va. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602). 
24. Id.
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by the entirety, a buyer successfully shifts those assets from an 
“unprotected” form of ownership to a “protected” form of owner-
ship. 
Alternatively, asset protection is achieved by shifting assets 
from a nonexempt form of property to an exempt form of proper-
ty.
25
 The term “exempt,” in the context of asset protection plan-
ning, refers to an asset that is “protected from all forms of credi-
tor process.”
26
 Similarly, the term “exemption” in such a context 
refers to the actual nature of the “protection from all forms of 
creditor process.”
27
 For example, Virginia law provides a debtor, 
inter alia, a “homestead exemption,”
28
 a “poor debtor’s exemp-
tion,”
29
 and an exemption for proceeds from a personal injury law-
suit.
30
 It is important to note, however, that exemptions can be 
creatures of both state and federal law, and the two might even 
overlap.
31
 One illustration of this interplay is Virginia law’s spe-
cific exemption of certain retirement accounts to the extent they 
are exempt under the Bankruptcy Code.
32
 
The function of an exemption is to put certain assets beyond 
the reach of creditors despite those assets being held by the debt-
or in an unprotected form. By way of illustration, a debtor who 
owns a pet dog typically does not own the dog in any form of pro-
tected ownership. The dog is not property of a legal entity nor 
owned as a tenancy by the entirety.
33
 Thus, absent some exemp-
tion to the contrary, creditors could theoretically, albeit heartless-
ly, subject the dog to the attachment process. In other words, a 
creditor could take possession of the dog and sell it to satisfy the 
creditor’s claim against the debtor. The Virginia General Assem-
bly, however, enacted a statutory provision providing that pets 
25. Richard M. Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State
Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (“Like all other states, Virginia exempts some of the 
defendant’s personal property from seizure, and these exemptions will protect the meager 
assets of many defaulting debtors.”). 
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 2011). The Code defines creditor process as “all
methods used by creditors to collect unsecured debts.”  Id. 
27. Id.
28. Id. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
29. Id. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
30. Id. § 34-28.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
31. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
33. See supra notes 20, 22 and accompanying text.
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are exempt from the creditor process.
34
 Therefore, even though 
the debtor’s dog in this hypothetical is held in an unprotected 
form of ownership, the debtor’s creditors will not be able to seize 
the dog and sell it to satisfy their claims. 
B.  Fraudulent Transfers 
Fraudulent transfer law is designed to protect creditors from 
certain asset transfers made by a debtor when those transfers 
have the effect of depriving creditors of recovery to which they are 
legally entitled.
35
 However, not every shift of assets that minimiz-
es some unanticipated creditor’s recovery in the distant future 
constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Rather, under Virginia law, a 
creditor has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 
evidence that a specific transfer comports with one of two statuto-
rily defined types of fraudulent transfers.
36
 If a creditor is success-
ful in making such a showing, the burden shifts to the transfer’s 
proponent to demonstrate the lawfulness of the transfer.
37
 Failure 
to carry this burden will result in the court avoiding the trans-
fer—meaning the court will restore title of the transferred asset 
to the debtor so that the asset is subject to the creditor process.
38
 
Virginia has two statutes conferring standing on creditors to 
seek avoidance of any given transfer. Virginia Code section 55-80 
enables creditors to challenge transfers of assets made with the 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud those creditors from that which 
they are or may be lawfully entitled.
39
 Virginia Code section 55-81 
enables creditors to challenge transfers of assets made by insol-
vent debtors for insufficient consideration—i.e., consideration not 
deemed valuable in law.
40
 Such transfers are often termed “volun-
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26(5) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
35. Osborne, ACTEC Fellows, supra note 6, at 655.
36. See Mills v. Miller Harness Co., 229 Va. 155, 157, 326 S.E.2d 665, 666 (1985) (cit-
ing Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, 335, 108 S.E. 677, 680 (1921)); Noramco Int’l v. Char-
lie’s Pizza, Ltd., 55 Va. Cir. 47, 47 (2001) (Fairfax County). 
37. Levy v. Kindred, 854 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Hutcheson v. Sav. Bank
of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 292, 105 S.E. 677, 681 (1921); Baldwin v. Winfree’s Adm’r, 116 
Va. 16, 20, 81 S.E. 36, 37 (1914)); Phillips v. Moazzeni (In re Tarangelo), 378 B.R. 128, 134 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
38. See, e.g., In re Tarangelo, 378 B.R. at 136–38 (holding that the defense’s failure to
rebut presumption of fraud resulted in avoidance of transfer/conveyance). 
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
40. Id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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tary conveyances.”
41
 For the purposes of this essay, however, 
transfers that are avoidable under section 55-81 also will be la-
beled “fraudulent transfers.” 
Although this essay focuses exclusively on Virginia law, there 
are at least two bodies of fraudulent transfer law commercial at-
torneys in Virginia must be familiar with: (1) Virginia fraudulent 
transfer laws
42
 and (2) the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer 
laws.
43
 Federal bankruptcy law recognizes the same two catego-
ries of fraudulent transfers as Virginia—albeit with different 
governing standards—in addition to several others which tend to 
be relied upon less frequently by creditors.
44
 Virginia attorneys 
also would benefit from familiarity with the majority uniform 
law, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), due to the 
number of jurisdictions in the nation that have adopted the exact 
act or some permutation of it.
45
 
The categories of fraudulent transfers provided for in Virginia 
law are sufficiently broad to ensure that almost any asset protec-
tion planning transfer could be deemed a fraudulent transfer un-
der the right circumstances.
46
 For example, a debtor attempting to 
transfer personal assets to a legal entity in order to place them in 
a protected form of ownership could be found to have done so with 
the intent to defraud some unknown creditor in the distant future 
or for inadequate consideration during a period of insolvency. 
Thus, while identifying the legal distinction between asset protec-
tion planning and fraudulent transfers is easy, the actual legal 
difference between them is unquestionably fact-driven. 
III. THE LEGAL DIFFERENCE
If Virginia’s fraudulent transfer laws are assigned their broad-
est possible meaning, it becomes difficult to envision a scenario in 
which asset protection planning would not be considered a fraud-
41. See, e.g., In re Tarangelo, 378 B.R. at 131.
42. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
43. See 11 U.S.C § 548 (2006).
44. See id. § 548(a)(1)(A) to (B).
45. See Isaac A. McBeth & Landon C. Davis III, Bulls, Bears, and Pigs: Revisiting the
Legal Minefield of Virginia Fraudulent Transfer Law, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 274 (2011) 
[hereinafter McBeth, Bulls]. “Currently, Virginia is one of eight jurisdictions that has not 
adopted the [UFTA].” Id. 
46. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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ulent transfer.
47
 Indeed, one could argue that an intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud some creditor seeking recovery on a claim, 
whether that creditor is known or unknown, is the only purpose 
for individuals or entities to engage in asset protection planning.
48
 
Such an argument notwithstanding, there are internal limita-
tions within section 55-80 and section 55-81 that, if reviewed with 
a critical eye, enable an attorney to draw a broad, fuzzy line be-
tween asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers. Sadly, 
absent some clear guidance from the courts or the General As-
sembly, that line always will be rife with plenty of gray area. 
Nonetheless, the authors of this essay maintain that asset protec-
tion planning attorneys should take three factors into account 
when evaluating the legal and ethical propriety of assisting a cli-
ent in any given transfer. The first factor is the nature of the 
debtor’s creditors. The second factor is whether any badges of 
fraud can be identified in relation to the transfer. The third factor 
is the nature of the client’s financial circumstances. The import of 
these three factors in parsing out whether a client’s goals are 
properly categorized as legitimate asset protection planning or 
fraudulent transfers is discussed below. 
A.  Nature of Creditors 
The first step an attorney should take in attempting to deter-
mine whether a client’s asset protection goals are tantamount to 
fraudulent transfers is to determine whether the class of persons 
or entities protected by Virginia’s fraudulent transfer statutes ex-
ist vis-à-vis the transferee. Specifically, as a threshold matter, the 
transferee must have creditors in order for any given transfer to 
be attacked as fraudulent.
49
 The relief for which Virginia’s fraudu-
lent transfer statutes provide is not available to a party simply by 
virtue of membership in the general public.
50
 Only creditors, pur-
47. See John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When A
Claimant Doesn’t Have A Claim, When A Transfer Isn’t A Transfer, When Fraud Doesn’t 
Stay Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset 
Protection Planner, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 957 (1997) (observing that if majority fraudu-
lent transfer law were assigned its broadest possible meaning, all asset protection plan-
ning would be impermissible). 
48. See id. (“Simply stated, asset protection planners seek to frustrate plaintiffs who
might someday try to collect from the planner’s client.”). 
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
50. Id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (identifying voluntary conveyances void as to “credi-
tors” and “purchasers”); Efessiou v. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. 142, 144 (1996) (Fairfax County) 
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chasers, or other similarly situated persons have standing to in-
voke the statutes’ protection.
51
 Moreover, the scope of creditors, 
purchasers, or others persons who may bring an avoidance action 
varies by statute. Section 55-80 is available to a broader group of 
creditors than section 55-81.
52
 Thus, to determine whether any 
members of the statutorily protected class are present in relation 
to any given transfer, an attorney must be armed with certain 
background knowledge: (i) the definition of a “creditor” under ap-
plicable fraudulent transfer laws, and (ii) the scope of protected 
creditors under any given fraudulent transfer law. 
The term “creditor” is not defined in title 55 of the Virginia 
Code, although some guidance is provided on how the term is to 
be construed.
53
 Relying on this guidance, the learned Judge 
Ledbetter observed that “[t]he term ‘creditors’ embraces all credi-
tors who but for the transfer would have had a right to subject 
the property to their debts.”
54
 Judge Ledbetter’s statement, which 
focused on the “right” of a party as opposed to whether that party 
has reduced a claim to judgment,
55
 appears consistent with other 
judicial discussions of the issue. Namely, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia explained that a “creditor” may be a party whose claim is 
contingent, immature, or not yet reduced to a judgment as of the 
time of the purported fraudulent transfer.
56
 
(“The three classes of parties who have standing to bring an action under Code § 55-80 are 
‘creditors,’ ‘purchasers,’ and ‘other persons.’”). 
51. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. at 144 (citing Estate Const. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding
Co., 14 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
52. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (including “creditors, purchas-
ers, or other persons”), with id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (including “creditors” and “pur-
chasers”). 
53. See id. § 55-103 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (“The words ‘creditors’ and ‘purchasers’ . . . shall 
not be restricted to the protection of creditors of and purchases from the grantor, but shall 
also extend to and embrace all creditors and purchasers who, but for the deed or writing, 
would have had title to the property conveyed or a right to subject it to their debts.”). 
54. Richie v. Grammer, 15 Va. Cir. 418, 419 (1989) (Spotsylvania County). This defini-
tion appears to be consistent with the definition of “creditor” provided for by the UFTA, 
which defines a creditor as a person who has a “claim.” UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 5, 7A, pt. 2 U.L.A. 14 (2006). A claim, in turn, is defined as “a right to payment, whether
or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Id.  
55. Richie, 15 Va. Cir. at 419.
56. See Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 277 Va. 359, 366,
672 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2009) (citations omitted); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 266 Va. 207, 213, 
585 S.E.2d 533, 536 (2003). 
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Virginia law further separates creditors into two classes: exist-
ing creditors and future creditors.
57
 The relevant point for distin-
guishing the two is the time the allegedly fraudulent transfer is 
made.
58
 An existing creditor is one whose claim existed at the 
time of the transfer.
59
 A future creditor is one whose claim arose 
after the transfer.
60
 For the purposes of asset protection planning 
and this essay, the distinction between existing creditors and fu-
ture creditors is relevant because section 55-80 confers standing 
on both existing and future creditors, whereas section 55-81 con-
fers standing only on existing creditors.
61
 
Any given client’s pool of future creditors may be divided fur-
ther into two subcategories: (i) future creditors who are foreseea-
ble to the transferee (“foreseeable future creditors”); and (ii) fu-
ture creditors who are not foreseeable to the transferee 
(“unforeseeable future creditors”).
62
 An example of a foreseeable 
future creditor is a doctor’s patient who is scheduled to undergo 
surgery after the subject asset transfer.
63
 An example of an un-
foreseeable future creditor is a motorcyclist the doctor injures in a 
motor vehicle accident after the subject asset transfer.
64
 Admit-
tedly, there does not appear to be any Virginia statute or case law 
employing the particular phraseology of “foreseeable future credi-
tors” or “unforeseeable future creditors.” Nonetheless, particular-
ly in the context of asset protection planning, dividing future 
creditors into the subcategories of foreseeable future creditors 
and unforeseeable future creditors is consistent with court opin-
ions from other jurisdictions, as well as scholarship on the topic of 
fraudulent transfer law.
65
 
57. Balzer & Assocs., Inc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 250 Va. 527, 530–31, 463 S.E.2d
453, 455 (1995). 
58. Wiebel v. Hunt, 68 Va. Cir. 191, 193 (2005) (Greene County).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Compare id. (explaining that conveyances under section 55-80 may be challenged
by future creditors), with Battle v. Rock, 144 Va. 1, 15, 131 S.E. 344, 348 (1926) (“The 
principle upon which voluntary conveyances are held void as to existing creditors is that a 
man should be just before he is generous.” (emphasis added)). 
62. Duncan E. Osborne & Mark E. Osborne, Asset Protection Trust Planning, ST041
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 12 (2012) [hereinafter Osborne, Asset Protection]. 
63. Jacob Stein, Asset Protection May Risk Fraudulent Transfer Violations, 37 EST. 
PLAN. 12, 15 (2010) [hereinafter Stein, Violations]. 
64. Id.
65. See id.; see also Osborne, Asset Protection, supra note 62.
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Based on the foregoing, an asset protection attorney can cate-
gorize a client’s status vis-à-vis creditors into one of the following: 
(a) the client maintains no existing creditors nor foreseeable fu-
ture creditors, but may have unforeseeable future creditors (“Cat-
egory A”); (b) the client maintains no existing creditors, but does 
have foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable fu-
ture creditors (“Category B”); (c) the client maintains existing 
creditors but no foreseeable future creditors, and may have un-
foreseeable future creditors (“Category C”); or (d) the client main-
tains existing creditors as well as foreseeable future creditors, 
and may have unforeseeable future creditors (“Category D”). Be-
cause of section 55-80’s intent requirement
66
 and section 55-81’s 
grant of standing only to existing creditors,
67
 asset protection 
planning has a higher risk of being deemed fraudulent for certain 
client categories than for others. 
For example, a Category A client faces the least risk that any 
given asset protection planning transfer is, in reality, a fraudu-
lent transfer. The absence of any existing creditors at the time of 
the transfer eliminates all risk of a subsequent challenge based 
on section 55-81.
68
 Although section 55-80 permits future credi-
tors to bring an avoidance action, the statute provides that a 
debtor making a transfer with the intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors shall be void “as to such creditors, purchasers, or 
other persons.”
69
 This qualification within the statutory language 
seems to indicate that a creditor not contemplated by the debtor 
at the time of transfer would not have standing to invoke the pro-
tections of section 55-80. Given that a Category A client’s only 
creditors are unforeseeable future creditors whose existence is not 
known even to the client, it would be a strained argument for any 
such creditor to assert that the client effected the subject transfer 
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud that creditor. 
Although categories B, C, and D can be analyzed in similar 
fashion, such an analysis conducted in a vacuum would be both 
misleading and incomplete. The mere fact that a client has identi-
fiable existing creditors or foreseeable future creditors, standing 
alone, does not automatically merit the conclusion that all asset 
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
67. See id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
68. See id.
69. Id. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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protection planning transfers made by that client are fraudulent 
transfers. For example, a true millionaire who regularly makes 
retirement contributions despite having a $500 Visa credit card 
bill certainly has an existing creditor. However, given her finan-
cial condition, the millionaire likely is not making retirement con-
tributions with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Visa from 
recovering amounts owed to it—eliminating risk of avoidance of 
the retirement contributions under section 55-80.
70
 Moreover, the 
millionaire is not insolvent—eliminating risk of avoidance of the 
retirement contributions under section 55-81.
71
 Indeed, such a cli-
ent would be able to carry out asset planning protection transfers 
with a strong sense of security that those transfers would not be 
subject to subsequent challenge by way of section 55-80 and/or 
section 55-81. Therefore, for an asset protection planning attor-
ney to make a true analysis of a client’s future risks of fraudulent 
transfer litigation (as well as the attorney’s risks for future ethi-
cal reprimand), she must consider whether the transfer is accom-
panied by badges of fraud in addition to evaluating the client’s 
current financial situation. 
B.  Badges of Fraud 
In assessing a client’s asset protection planning goals for risk of 
future fraudulent transfer litigation, an attorney must determine 
whether the desired transfer will be accompanied by any badges 
of fraud. In essence, a “badge of fraud” is a specific type of cir-
cumstantial evidence that courts have branded as indicative of 
fraudulent intent.
72
 Badges of fraud play no role in analyzing 
whether section 55-81 applies to any given transfer, as the stat-
ute does not require an intent element.
73
 Badges of fraud function 
only to provide evidence of section 55-80’s requisite intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud creditors.
74
 Their existence is necessitated 
by the simple reality that a debtor seldom admits that an intent 
to hinder, delay, defraud creditors accompanied his decision, for 
70. See id.
71. See id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
72. Temple v. Jones, Son & Co., 179 Va. 286, 298, 19 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1942).
73. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation v. Nicolet, 62 Va. Cir. 372, 373 (2003) (Richmond City).
74. Phillips v. Moazzeni (In re Tarangelo), 378 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)
(citing Hutcheson v. Sav. Bank of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 291, 105 S.E. 677, 680–81 
(1921)) (explaining the party challenging a transfer under section 55-80 may establish a 
prima facie case by proving badges of fraud existed in relation to the transfer). 
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example, to sell a priceless Cadillac to Grandpa Joe for the bar-
gain price of $1. In other words, because proving section 55-80’s 
intent element would be virtually impossible if the courts re-
quired direct evidence of that intent, a court will infer fraudulent 
intent if certain badges of fraud surround the transaction.
75
 In 
Virginia, badges of fraud include:  
(1) retention of an interest in the transferred property by the trans-
feror; (2) transfer between family members for allegedly antecedent 
debt; (3) pursuit of the transferor or threat of litigation by his credi-
tors at the time of the transfer; (4) lack of or gross inadequacy of 
consideration for the conveyance; (5) retention or possession of the 
property by transferor; and (6) fraudulent incurrence of indebtedness 
after the conveyance.
76
Attorneys should approach proposed asset protection transfers 
accompanied by any of the above-mentioned badges of fraud with 
caution, as a single badge of fraud is sufficient for a court to infer 
the transfer was motivated by the intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors.
77
 Moreover, the court need not find that such in-
tent was the primary or sole intent underlying the transfer.
78
 
Thus, it appears that transfers accompanied by a mixed intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and achieve long-term security 
still fall within the gamut of section 55-80.
79
 That being said, the 
presumption of fraudulent intent raised by badges of fraud can be 
rebutted if the proponent of any given transfer can produce evi-
dence of its bona fide nature.
80
 Therefore, badges of fraud should 
be perceived by asset protection planning attorneys as a legal and 
ethical yellow traffic light—a warning to slow down and examine 
the entire situation before proceeding. 
75. Id. (explaining that the court may rely on badges of fraud as proof of fraudulent
intent in the absence of direct evidence). 
76. Fox Rest Assocs., L.P. v. Little, 282 Va. 277, 285, 717 S.E.2d 126, 132 (2011) (cit-
ing Hyman v. Porter (In re Porter), 37 B.R. 56, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984)). 
77. Moore v. Manson (In re Springfield Furniture, Inc.), 145 B.R. 520, 534 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1992) (citing Hickman’s Ex’r v. Trout, 83 Va. 478, 491, 3 S.E. 131, 136 (1887)). 
78. Coleman v. Cmty. Trust Bank (In re Coleman), 285 B.R. 892, 908 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 2002). 
79. Id.
80. Balzer & Assocs., Inc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 250 Va. 527, 533, 463 S.E.2d 453,
457 (1995) (“Once a party has established a prima facie case in support of its claim that a 
transfer is voidable, the burden of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie case shifts 
to the opposing party.”). 
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C.  Financial Circumstances 
An honest examination of the client’s finances might be the 
most certain way to assess whether fraudulent transfer litigation 
is on the horizon. No attorney can make a reliable assessment of 
the permissibility of a client’s asset protection goals without some 
knowledge of the client’s financial standing. This is true for two 
reasons: (i) section 55-80’s intent requirement is inextricably tied 
to the financial condition of the transferor,
81
 and (ii) section 55-81 
only applies to insolvent transferors.
82
  
Regarding section 55-80, common sense dictates that financial-
ly secure clients are in a stronger position to make true asset pro-
tection transfers than those facing dire financial straits. A debtor 
making asset protection transfers while still maintaining suffi-
cient personal assets to honor obligations to creditors seemingly 
is not taking any action to the detriment of those creditors. It is 
important to note, however, that even insolvent clients can be fi-
nancially secure for the purposes of section 55-80.
83
 Indeed, insol-
vency alone is not a badge of fraud under Virginia law.
84
 If it 
were, most law school graduates and many homeowners would 
not be able to make lawful asset protection transfers. Rather than 
using insolvency as a litmus test for a transfer’s permissibility 
under section 55-80, attorneys should attempt to ascertain 
whether the client’s financial condition has deteriorated to the 
point that creditors are pursuing the client or threatening litiga-
tion. Such a condition, in itself, is a badge of fraud.
85
 Even if credi-
tors have not yet started pursuing the client or threatened litiga-
tion, the transfer will be sufficiently problematic if the client’s 
finances are such that he no longer can reasonably expect to meet 
his obligations to creditors.
86
 In such circumstances, a court is 
81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
82. See id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
83. McBeth, Bulls, supra note 45, at 318.
84. See Hutcheson v. Sav. Bank of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 291, 105 S.E. 677, 681
(1921) (quoting Hickman’s Ex’r v. Trout, 83 Va. 478, 491–92, 3 S.E. 131, 136–37 (1887) 
(not naming insolvency among the badges of fraud)). 
85. See, e.g., Fox Rest Assocs. L.P. v. Little, 282 Va. 277, 286, 717 S.E.2d 126, 132
(2011). 
86. See Butler v. Loomer (In re Loomer), 222 B.R. 618, 622 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998). For
the purposes of this essay, a client who reasonably can expect to honor obligations to credi-
tors will be termed “financially secure.” Conversely, a client who reasonably cannot expect 
to honor obligations to creditors will be termed “financially insecure.” 
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likely to conclude asset protection transfers are fraudulent trans-
fers.
87
 
Although not decided under Virginia law, the case of In re 
Loomer provides guidance on this point. In that case, the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska held that the debtor’s 
prepetition retirement contributions were fraudulent transfers.
88
 
The key fact driving the court’s holding was the debtor’s decision 
to make retirement contributions even after defaulting on a loan 
agreement and franchise agreement.
89
 From the court’s perspec-
tive, these defaults marked a point in time when the debtor knew 
or should have known that he no longer could fulfill his various 
payment obligations, indicating the presence of the requisite in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
90
 
Unlike section 55-80, which takes a more holistic snapshot of 
the debtor’s financial circumstances, section 55-81 relies on insol-
vency as the benchmark standard for seeking relief under the 
statute.
91
 In Hudson v. Hudson, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
discussed insolvency in the context of section 55-81.
92
 The court 
explained that a debtor is insolvent when he has insufficient 
property to pay all his debts.
93
 The process for conducting an in-
solvency analysis includes determining if the debtor’s liabilities 
exceed his assets.
94
 In comparing the liabilities and assets, how-
ever, the court will not include the value of the property trans-
ferred as an asset of the debtor.
95
 Rather, the court determines 
the net worth of the debtor following the transfer.
96
 This rule ap-
plies even in cases transferring individually held property into a 
87. See, e.g., id.
88. Id. at 623.
89. Id. at 621–22.
90. Id.
91. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012), with id. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol.
2012). 
92. 249 Va. 335, 340–41, 455 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1995).
93. Id. at 340, 455 S.E.2d at 17 (citing McArthur v. Chase, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 683, 694
(1857)). 
94. Id. at 340–41, 455 S.E.2d at 17 (citing Darden v. George G. Lee Co., 204 Va. 108,
109–11, 129 S.E.2d 897, 898–99 (1963); Gray v. McCormick, 181 Va. 52, 63–64, 23 S.E.2d 
803, 808–09 (1943)). 
95. Shaia v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 206 B.R. 410, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997), vacated,
244 F.3d 352, 355–57 (4th Cir. 2001) (vacated on misapplication of consideration deemed 
valuable in law standard). 
96. In re Meyer, 206 B.R. at 417.
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form of joint ownership, such as tenancy by the entirety.
97
 Addi-
tionally, the court will not include the value of any exempt prop-
erty or contingent property interests held by the debtor as part of 
the debtor’s net worth.
98
 Essentially, if the property is not capable 
of being attached, it is not an asset for the purposes of solvency 
calculations under section 55-81.
99
 
Accordingly, understanding a client’s financial condition is key 
to understanding the legal and ethical risks Virginia’s fraudulent 
transfer law poses to a specific proposed transfer. Although a 
slightly different standard should be employed when assessing 
avoidability under section 55-80 as opposed to section 55-81 (i.e., 
financial stability versus insolvency), much of the information re-
quired for making either assessment overlaps and may be ob-
tained through client interviews. 
D.  Using Factors to Find the Difference 
There is a difference between valid asset protection planning 
and fraudulent transfers. The difference, however, does not rest 
in the nature of the transfer. Indeed, transferring real estate to a 
legal entity so that it may be held in protected form may or may 
not be a fraudulent transfer.
100
 It depends on the client’s circum-
stances. An analysis of the client’s creditors, any potential badges 
of fraud accompanying the transfer, and the client’s financial 
standing will yield a reliable prediction as to on which side of the 
blurry “fraudulent transfer line” the client’s goals fall.
101
 
Given the fact-driven nature of differentiating between asset 
protection planning and fraudulent transfers, attempting to 
enunciate a bright-line legal rule would be both long-winded and 
unworkable in many situations. Nonetheless, the charts below 
serve as quick reference tools in assessing the risk of subsequent 
fraudulent transfer litigation in relation to any given transfer. 
97. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 418; see also In re Massey, 225 B.R. 887, 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).
99. In re Meyer, 206 B.R. at 418.
100. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra Parts III.A–C. 
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Table Definitions: 
Category A client: The client maintains no existing creditors 
nor foreseeable future creditors, but may have unforeseeable fu-
ture creditors. 
Category B client: The client maintains no existing creditors, 
but does have foreseeable future creditors and may have unfore-
seeable future creditors. 
Category C client: The client maintains existing creditors, but 
no foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable fu-
ture creditors. 
Category D client: The client maintains existing creditors as 
well as foreseeable future creditors, and may have unforeseeable 
future creditors. 
Table 1:  Section 55-80 Analysis Key: 
AS – Category A client (financially secure) 
BS – Category B client (financially secure) 
BI – Category B client (financially insecure) 
CS – Category C client (financially secure) 
CI – Category C client (financially insecure) 
DS – Category D client (financially secure) 
DI – Category D client (financially insecure) 
BOF – Badges of fraud accompanying transfer 
NBOF – No badges of fraud accompany transfer 
“+” – Transfer is likely legitimate asset protection 
“-“ – Transfer is likely fraudulent transfer 
“?” – Transfer is in gray area and should be heavily analyzed 
NOTE: “Financially secure” means a client’s income and assets in re-
lation to legal obligations create a reasonable expectation that the client 
is capable of honoring obligations to creditors 
AS BS BI CS CI DS DI 
BOF  +  ?  -  ?  -  ?  - 
NBOF  +  +  -  +  -  +  - 
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Table 2:  Section 55-81 Analysis Key: 
A – Category A client 
B – Category B client 
C – Category C client 
D – Category D client 
I – Client is insolvent 
S – Client is solvent 
“+” – Transfer is likely legitimate asset protection 
“-” – Transfer is likely a voluntary conveyance 
“?” - Transfer is in gray area and should be heavily analyzed 
NOTE: “Insolvent” means that the client’s liabilities exceed the client’s 
assets after excluding all property owned by the client that would not be 
counted as an asset for solvency purposes from the calculation. 
NOTE: This table assumes the transferor has not received considera-
tion deemed valuable in law in exchange for the transfer. 
 A  B  C  D 
 I  +  +  -  - 
 S  +  +  +  + 
IV. THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE
Understanding the difference between asset protection plan-
ning and fraudulent transfers offers Virginia attorneys additional 
benefits beyond anticipating the legal effects of a proposed trans-
fer. Modern ethics opinions indicate there is a cognizable ethical 
difference between assisting a client in asset protection planning 
transfers as opposed to effecting fraudulent transfers.
102
 Indeed, 
an attorney found on the wrong side of the fence in this regard 
might face severe ethical repercussions.
103
 
Virginia’s Legal Ethics Opinion 1771 (“LEO 1771”) discusses a 
lawyer’s ethical obligations when faced with a client who wishes 
to effect a fraudulent transfer.
104
 Unfortunately, Virginia’s guid-
ance on the issue is limited to this one advisory opinion. LEO 
1771 examines a hypothetical situation in which a client seeks to 
102. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). 
103. See, e.g., infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
104. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). 
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transfer her only asset to her husband and herself as tenants by 
the entirety.
105
 The hypothetical transfer would involve no remu-
nerative consideration, and would place the transferred assets 
out of the reach of the client’s creditors.
106
 LEO 1771 correctly 
presumes that absent other mitigating factors, the transfer would 
be void under section 55-80 and voidable under section 55-81.
107
 
LEO 1771 provides that, under the above-described circumstanc-
es, the applicable ethical rule is Virginia Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.2(c) (“RPC 1.2(c)”).
108
 RPC 1.2(c) states: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a law-
yer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or appli-
cation of the law.
109
The ethics committee determined that whether the lawyer 
seeking guidance in LEO 1771 would be found in violation of RPC 
1.2(c) hinged on a question of substantive law outside of its pur-
view.
110
 Specifically, the committee determined that “[a] definitive 
conclusion as to . . . whether the attorney in this hypothetical can 
assist this client without violating Rule 1.2(c) would require an 
analysis of whether a transfer described by §§ 55-80 and/or 55-81 
constitutes fraud.”
111
 Therefore, aside from identifying the appli-
cable ethical rule, LEO 1771 offers little guidance to Virginia 
practitioners attempting to determine whether a client’s request-
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
110. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). In cases regarding different 
areas of law, the ethics committee similarly has declared that a substantive legal question 
regarding the legality of a particular conduct is outside the purview of the committee and 
has concluded only that an attorney should not counsel his client to take the specified ac-
tion where the attorney determines the conduct in question is illegal. Id. (citing id. L. Eth-
ics Op. 1227 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (regarding whether an attorney could assist potential par-
ents in certain steps towards private adoption); id. L. Ethics Op. 1222 (Repl. Vol. 2002) 
(regarding whether an attorney could assist in a settlement involving secrecy about crimi-
nal acts in light of the statutes addressing misprision of a felony); id. L. Ethics Op. 1219 
(Repl. Vol. 2002) (regarding whether an attorney could arrange for one client to loan a se-
cond client money for litigation expenses in light of the statutes addressing champerty and 
maintenance); id. L. Ethics Op. 782 (Repl. Vol. 2002) (regarding whether an attorney could 
advise a client separated and divorcing her husband to enter their jointly owned home in 
which only the husband resided to remove her personal property)). 
111. Id. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). 
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ed asset protection transfer—which may be subsequently avoida-
ble pursuant to sections 55-80 and/or 55-81—would, if car-
ried into effect, create risk of disciplinary repercussions. 
A thorough examination of Virginia jurisprudence reveals no 
cases nor opinions in which the above-described situation is ad-
dressed in more detail. However, other jurisdictions applying 
substantively identical or substantially similar ethical rules offer 
some guidance.
112
 The following sections address the elements of 
RPC 1.2(c) in greater detail, and examine cases and ethical opin-
ions from other jurisdictions in order to provide insight and guid-
ance to Virginia lawyers faced with a situation occupying this 
ethical gray area. 
A. RPC 1.2(c) 
As noted above, RPC 1.2(c) provides: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a law-
yer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or applica-
tion of the law.
113
Based on this language, an attorney violates RPC 1.2(c) when 
she (i) knowingly (ii) counsels a client to engage in or assists a cli-
ent in (iii) conduct which is criminal or fraudulent.
114
 In the con-
text of fraudulent transfers, however, these requirements become 
somewhat blurred. 
1. Knowingly
The term “knowingly” in the context of RPC 1.2(c) “denotes ac-
tual knowledge of the fact in question.”
115
 It refers to a lawyer’s 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the rele-
 112. However, the author must note that “[a]lthough interpretation of similar language 
in the ABA Model Rules by other states’ courts and bars might be helpful to understand-
ing Virginia’s Rules, those foreign interpretations should not be binding in Virginia.” VA. 
SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Scope (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
113. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
114. See id. 
115. Id. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012) (noting that “[a] person’s 
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”). 
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vant conduct.
116
 Phrased alternatively, RPC 1.2(c)’s “knowingly” 
requirement cannot be met simply by proving that a lawyer knew 
she was assisting in a transfer or knew she was advising her cli-
ent to make a transfer.
117
 To violate this rule a lawyer must know 
that the transfer she advises the client to make is “fraudulent” as 
defined by the Rules.
118
 The Rules’ unique definition of the term 
“fraudulent” is examined more thoroughly below.
119
 Thus, it ap-
pears that a large part of determining whether a lawyer acted 
ethically hinges on the lawyer’s intent. Although Virginia offers 
little guidance, other jurisdictions provide some insight. 
The case of In re Mirabile, from the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
discusses the “knowingly” element in greater detail.
120
 There, Mr. 
Moroney, an attorney, represented Mr. Leahy in a child support 
hearing.
121
 At this hearing, the court held that Mr. Leahy’s cur-
rent child support payments to his first wife were insufficient 
based on his monthly income of $7000.
122
 The judge ordered that 
Mr. Leahy pay an additional $1580 per month in child support 
payments.
123
 Dismayed by the verdict, Mr. Moroney and Mr. 
Leahy’s wife at the time of the hearing, Mrs. Joyce Leahy, sought 
to avoid these increased payments.
124
 Upon hearing the verdict, 
Mr. Moroney stated to the judge that Mr. Leahy could avoid the 
increased child support payments by divorcing Mrs. Joyce Leahy 
and transferring assets into her name.
125
 Mr. Moroney spoke with 
Mrs. Joyce Leahy, and upon her request, recommended several 
divorce attorneys, including Mr. Mirabile.
126
 After Mrs. Joyce 
Leahy hired Mr. Mirabile, Mr. Moroney and Mr. Mirabile worked 
jointly on the necessary paperwork and filed the necessary docu-
ments.
127
 The filing included a separation agreement in which Mr. 
116. See id.  
117. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
118. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). The rules define fraud and fraudulent as 
“conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation, or fail-
ure to apprise another of relevant information.” Id. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology 
(Repl. Vol. 2012). 
119. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
120. 975 S.W.2d 936, 940–41 (Mo. 1998). 
121. Id. at 937. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 937–38. 
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Leahy agreed to pay Mrs. Joyce Leahy a total of $7000 in child 
support and alimony each month.
128
 Mr. Leahy’s first wife filed a 
complaint after a temporary order implementing the stipulation 
was entered, and the divorce and separation agreement were lat-
er set aside by the court.
129
 Mr. Leahy and Mrs. Joyce Leahy soon 
reconciled and were again living together in California when dis-
ciplinary actions against Mr. Moroney and Mr. Mirabile began.
130
 
The master of the disciplinary counsel found both attorneys to be 
in violation of the state’s ethical rules.
131
 The master specifically 
found that the timing of Mr. Leahy and Mrs. Joyce Leahy’s di-
vorce and separation agreement, as well as the fact that Mr. 
Moroney and Mr. Mirabile were their personal friends, constitut-
ed sufficient evidence to find that both lawyers acted with the 
requisite intent to defraud Mr. Leahy’s first wife.
132
 Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri overturned the master’s finding 
that both Mr. Mirabile and Mr. Moroney breached the ethical 
rules.
133
 
In support of its finding, the court noted that the Leahys’ tes-
timony that they had desired a divorce, actually separated, and 
complied with the court’s separation order was proof that Mr. 
Moroney and Mr. Mirabile did not necessarily know that the sep-
aration proceeding was for the purpose of defrauding Mr. Leahy’s 
first wife.
134
 The court wrote:  
There is no evidence that the respondents encouraged Joseph Leahy 
to refuse to pay his child support, nor any proof that he was ever un-
able to pay the child support (as he candidly testified he had the re-
sources to pay it). The contempt order only shows that Joseph Leahy 
did not want to pay the child support, and does not constitute evi-
dence of misconduct on the part of the respondents.”
135
The court also stated that “[l]awyers are responsible for plead-
ings and other documents prepared in litigation, but need not 
have personal knowledge of matters asserted in documents sub-
mitted to courts because such documents contain assertions of the 
128. Id. at 938. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 939. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 941. 
134. Id. at 940–41. 
135. Id. at 941 (citation omitted). 
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client, not the lawyer.”
136
 Particularly germane to the “knowingly” 
element is Judge Holstein’s discussion of Mirabile’s intentions in 
filing the divorce and separation agreement in his separate opin-
ion.
137
 Judge Holstein stated: 
With respect to respondent Mirabile, the evidence that he knew the 
Leahys’ ulterior motive in filing the [divorce and separation agree-
ment] is not as strong or clear as that implicating Moroney. Unlike 
Moroney, Mirabile was essentially brought into this situation by a 
colleague, not by an emotional, vindictive client. The extent of Mira-
bile’s knowledge of [Mr. Leahy’s] underlying legal controversy in [the 
child support hearing against his first wife] is unclear. Mirabile was, 
therefore, more likely an unwitting participant in the Leahys’ 
scheme. While his lack of diligence in inquiring into the details of his 
client’s circumstances is troubling, it is not usually a cause for sub-
stantial discipline.
138
However, Judge Holstein had a different position on whether 
Mr. Moroney knowingly participated in the fraudulent transfer of 
assets.
139
 Judge Holstein stated: 
A lawyer with the full knowledge of the circumstances Moroney had 
at hand should at least be held to the same standard as a reasonable 
person in recognizing that fraud was afoot. Without other contradic-
tory information a lawyer might . . . believe the statements of a cli-
ent. But the lawyer-client relationship does not suspend the lawyer’s 
need to exercise common sense in evaluating the client’s intent to 
commit a fraud.
140
The case of Florida Bar v. Cohen aligns with Judge Holstein’s 
dissent.
141
 In Cohen, the attorney counseled his client to execute a 
mortgage and note on behalf of a corporation (of which the client 
was the sole shareholder) in favor of the attorney and the indi-
vidual client.
142
 Subsequently, the attorney and client foreclosed 
on the mortgage, and the attorney filed an affidavit of indebted-
ness claiming that the corporation owed his client and himself the 
principal amount due on the note plus interest.
143
 The ethics 
136. Id. at 940. 
137. See id. at 944 (Holstein, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
138. Id. 
139. See id. at 943. 
140. Id. at 944. 
141. See 534 So.2d 392, 392–93 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the attorney, Cohen, was 
guilty of engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, 
and suspending Cohen’s license to practice law for ninety-one days). 
142. Id. at 392. 
143. Id. 
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committee’s referee determined that the attorney made these 
transactions in order to allow his client to avoid paying high in-
surance premiums and damages owed by the transferring corpo-
ration to multiple individuals.
144
 The court sanctioned the attor-
ney for violating Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) (“DR 7-102(A)(7)”), 
“counseling or assisting his client in illegal or fraudulent con-
duct.”
145
 The fact that Mr. Cohen had a history of disciplinary 
problems was germane to the court’s holding.
146
 The court noted 
that in Cohen v. New Sunrise Investment Corp., Florida’s “Elev-
enth Judicial Circuit held that Cohen had transferred real prop-
erties fraudulently and ordered the conveyances to be set 
aside.”
147
 
Although not involving fraudulent transfer law, another disci-
plinary case, Florida Bar v. Cohen (hereinafter referred to as 
“Cohen II”), helps clarify the type of conduct that might fulfill the 
“knowingly” requirement of RPC 1.2(c).
148
 In Cohen II, Mr. Cohen 
was charged with felony conspiracy.
149
 The conspiracy revolved 
around Mr. Cohen’s structuring of financial transactions to avoid 
reporting cash transfers of $10,000 or more, in violation of title 31 
of the United States Code.
150
 Mr. Cohen pled guilty to the charges 
and revealed that he had personally concealed and received about 
$640,000.
151
 Mr. Cohen performed these transactions on behalf of 
a client who later was found to be a major drug distributor.
152
 The 
disciplinary charges brought against Mr. Cohen focused on his 
criminal conduct.
153
 At his disciplinary hearing, Mr. Cohen 
claimed he did not know the money at issue was the product of an 
illegal operation, and that he believed the money to be the fruit of 
a legitimate enterprise.
154
 The Supreme Court of Florida, agreeing 
with the disciplinary hearing’s referee, rejected this claim: 
144. Id. at 392–93. 
145. Id. at 393. 
146. See id. 
147. Id. (citation omitted).  
148. See 908 So.2d 405, 411 (Fla. 2005) (finding that Cohen “knowingly” conspired with 
his client). 
149. Id. at 407. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 408. 
154. See id. 
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We also approve of the referee’s use of common sense and logic in 
making his factual findings based on the evidence presented. We 
agree that it strains credulity that an attorney would believe that 
$640,000 in cash delivered in plastic-wrapped $10,000 bundles for 
storage in a safety deposit box was legitimately acquired.
155
Although at first blush RPC 1.2(c)’s “knowingly” requirement 
appears ambiguous, comment nine of RPC 1.2(c), when read in 
conjunction with the above cases, offers substantial guidance.
156
 
Comment nine’s provision differentiating between presenting le-
gal analysis of a course of conduct and recommending a means by 
which to execute fraud
157
 combined with the Rules’ permission to 
prove knowledge with circumstantial evidence informs the is-
sue.
158
 It seems that whether a lawyer had actual knowledge of 
the fraudulent nature of the transfer depends on the extenuating 
and mitigating factors surrounding it. Cohen II exemplifies this 
principle; the court found it unbelievable that any reasonable 
person would believe $640,000 cash in neatly packaged bundles 
was earned from a legitimate enterprise.
159
 
However, perhaps the most decisive factor in a court or disci-
plinary committee’s decision is whether or not the attorney can 
provide a non-fraudulent explanation for the transfer. In Mirabi-
le, the evidence that played a major role in persuading the court 
to overturn the disciplinary committee’s findings was the fact the 
clients actually were separated for a period of time and complied 
with the court’s separation orders.
160
 Similarly, Judge Holstein in 
his separate opinion noted that it was more likely that Mr. Mira-
bile lacked the fraudulent intent necessary to be found in viola-
tion of the ethical rules because he did not represent Mr. Leahy in 
the original child support hearing; as compared with Mr. Moro-
ney who had done so.
161
 If an attorney can show a non-fraudulent 
basis for a transfer, the prosecuting body will have a very difficult 
time proving that the attorney knew the transfer was “fraudu-
lent.” This is in large part due to the unique definition of the term 
155. Id. at 411 (citation omitted). 
156. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
157. Id. 
158. See id. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
159. See Cohen, 908 So.2d at 411. 
160. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text. 
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“fraudulent” contained in the Rules, which is discussed in more 
detail in Part IV.A.3. 
2. Advising Versus Counseling to Engage or Assisting
RPC 1.2(c) forbids an attorney from assisting a client with or 
counseling a client to engage in a transfer of assets that would be 
fraudulent within the meaning of the Rules.
162
 RPC 1.2(c) does not 
prohibit, however, an attorney from discussing the legal conse-
quences of a proposed transaction.
163
 The second clause of RPC 
1.2(c)—“but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any 
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist 
a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning, or application of the law”
164
—supports the maxim 
that a lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the ac-
tual consequences that are likely to result from a client’s con-
duct.
165
 If the client chooses to act against the attorney’s advice 
and proceed in a manner that is criminal or fraudulent, the law-
yer is not necessarily a party to the action.
166
 There is a signifi-
cant ethical difference between advising a client on his legal op-
tions (including the validity, scope, and application of the law) 
and “recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might 
be committed with impunity.”
167
 Thus, if an attorney determines 
that a proposed transfer constitutes fraudulent conduct, the at-
torney only would be permitted to “explain the legal consequences 
of the client’s proposal, namely, that the transfer would be void 
with regard to those creditors [the] client wishes to evade.”
168
 
The case of In re Hockett from the Supreme Court of Oregon 
provides an excellent example of the type of behavior considered 
an ethical violation.
169
 There, the court suspended the attorney 
from practice for sixty-three days for conduct arising from his 
handling of two divorce cases and related property transfers.
170
 
162. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
166. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
167. See id. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
168. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). 
169. 734 P.2d 877 (Or. 1987). 
170. Id. at 879–80. 
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The court sanctioned the attorney for, among other reasons, vio-
lating DR 1-102(A)(7), which provided that an attorney shall not 
“[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to 
be illegal or fraudulent.”
171
 The attorney represented clients who 
were indebted to banks and individuals in amounts approaching 
$400,000.
172
 The conduct in question involved the attorney’s assis-
tance and counsel in filing for divorce between the clients and 
their respective wives, and subsequently transferring all of the 
clients’ assets to their wives as part of each property settlement 
agreement.
173
 The issue of whether the attorney crossed the 
boundary between merely counseling his clients and counseling 
them to engage or assisting is determined easily. The attorney 
performed the acts necessary to effect the transfer.
174
 Given that 
the other requirements of “knowingly” and “fraudulent” were sat-
isfied, the attorney violated the ethical rules.
175
 
The case of In re Kenyon also provides a useful example of 
when an attorney crosses the line separating mere advisement 
and conduct that constitutes “counseling to engage or assisting.”
176
 
This Supreme Court of South Carolina case involved the conduct 
of two lawyers, Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk.
177
 The issues revolved 
around their handling of the estate of Mr. Meredith, a longtime 
client of their firm.
178
 Prior to the purported ethical violation, Mr. 
Meredith was sought by federal authorities in connection with 
drug violations.
179
 He eventually committed suicide, and Mr. Ken-
yon and Mr. Lusk subsequently handled his estate.
180
 At the time 
of Mr. Meredith’s death, there was in excess of $540,000 of claims 
against his estate.
181
 Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk provided assis-
tance in conveying a parcel of property owned by Mr. Meredith’s 
estate to a corporation of which Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk were 
sole owners.
182
 Following this conveyance, another corporation 
171. Id. at 881 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980)). 
172. Id. at 879. 
173. Id. at 880. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 881–83. 
176. 491 S.E.2d 252, 256 (S.C. 1997). 
177. Id. at 253. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. at 253–54. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 254. 
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owned by Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Lusk provided a $250,000 mort-
gage on the property.
183
 Finally, the property was re-conveyed to 
Mr. Meredith’s children, and the mortgage was satisfied.
184
 These 
transactions removed the property from the estate, to which cred-
itors would have first claim, and transferred the property directly 
to Mr. Meredith’s children, circumventing probate.
185
 Obviously 
such conduct far surpassed mere advising, as Mr. Kenyon and 
Mr. Lusk had proactive roles in the transfers, ranging from con-
structing the necessary paperwork to actually serving as straw-
men to effectuate the transaction.
186
 
Florida Bar v. Cohen is another case in which the issue of ad-
vising versus counseling to engage or assisting is fairly straight-
forward.
187
 Here, the attorney again crossed the line between 
merely advising a client of her rights and behavior that violated 
the ethical rules.
188
 In Cohen, the attorney not only counseled his 
client to execute the mortgage (in and of itself a violation of the 
rule), but also assisted the client by becoming a part of the trans-
action and later initiating foreclosure proceedings.
189
 
The requirement of counseling to engage or assisting is the 
most straightforward of Rule 1.2(c)’s three requirements.
190
 In the 
context of this requirement the ethical line is clear. On one end, 
an attorney may discuss the implications of a proposed course of 
conduct and explain the legal consequences of acting upon it. This 
will not result in an ethical breach. Quite to the contrary, this 
conduct is exactly the type which lawyers are expected to provide. 
On the other end of the spectrum are situations in which the at-
torney takes an active role in the transfer, either by preparing 
the documents as in In re Hockett,
191
 or by acting as a strawman 
in more extreme cases, such as in In re Kenyon.
192
 These actions 
clearly meet RPC 1.2(c)’s “counsel[ing] . . . to engage, or as-
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. See id. at 254–55. 
187. 534 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1988). This case was examined in the context of a discus-
sion of the “knowingly” requirement of RPC 1.2(c) above. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
188. Cohen, 534 S.E. 2d at 393. 
189. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
190. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
191. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 176–86 and accompanying text. 
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sist[ing]” requirement.
193
 The only possible gray area exists in sit-
uations where an attorney clearly lays out how a client might ef-
fect a transfer which the attorney knows to be fraudulent, but 
stops short of assisting with the transfer. In this hypothetical it is 
helpful to imagine an unscrupulous attorney providing his client 
a clear outline of how to make herself judgment proof, and then 
adds, with a wink and a nod, that it would be unethical for the at-
torney to advise the client to follow that path. In such cases, the 
court or disciplinary committee will face the arduous task of de-
termining whether the attorney was merely advising the client of 
the implications of the proposed actions, or counseling the client 
to engage in the conduct. This determination will hinge on the ev-
idence presented. 
3. Fraudulent
In order to determine whether an attorney who counsels a cli-
ent to engage in or assists a client in conducting a transfer avoid-
able under sections 55-80 and/or 55-81 is liable for misconduct 
under RPC 1.2(c), one must look to the unique definition of the 
word “fraudulent” contained in the Rules.
194
 The Rules define 
“fraudulent” as “conduct having a purpose to deceive and not 
merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another 
of relevant information.”
195
 This definition indicates that the 
transfer must be made with some degree of scienter, deceit or in-
tent to mislead another party.
196
 In sum, “[w]hether or not a par-
ticular transaction is a fraudulent transfer as a matter of sub-
stantive law is not the decisive factor in applying the Rules. The 
decisive factor[] [is] whether the lawyer knows that the transfer 
constitutes conduct having a purpose to deceive. . . .”
197
 This quali-
ty of deceit seems to indicate that the conduct must be analogous 
to “fraud” as the word is defined in the tortious sense. However, 
193. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
194. See VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1771 (Cum. Supp. 2012). 
195. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
196. See Denis Kleinfeld & Jonathan Alper, The Florida Supreme Court Finds No Lia-
bility For Aiding Or Abetting A Fraudulent Transfer, 78 FLA. B.J. 22, 27 (June 2004) 
[hereinafter Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court].  
 197. Gideon Rothschild & Daniel S. Rubin, Asset-Protection Planning: Ethical? Legal? 
Obligatory?, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Sept. 2003, at 42, 43, http://mosessinger.com/articles/ 
files/AssetProtectionPlanning-Ethical-Legal-Obligatory.pdf [hereinafter Rothschild, Ethi-
cal?]. 
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upon closer examination, it is clear this definition falls short of 
what is required to prove the common law tort of fraud. 
a. Fraud Versus Fraudulent
Professor Prosser in Prosser on Torts stated that the common 
law tort of fraud consists of the following elements: 
(i)    a false representation of fact,  
(ii)   knowledge or belief that the representation is false, 
(iii)  an intention to induce another to act,  
(iv)  justifiable reliance by such person, and  
(v)   damages resulting in such reliance.
198
 
The definition of a fraudulent transfer is vastly different. A 
fraudulent transfer is not a tort; it is a remedy created by the 
Commonwealth’s legislature.
199
 Several courts discussed the im-
portance of this distinction within the context of ethical rules. In 
Elliot v. Glushon, the Ninth Circuit “held that fraudulent trans-
fers in the context of bankruptcy include a great variety of actions 
which are not common law fraud.”
200
 Connecticut Informal Opin-
ion 91-22 (“Opinion 91-22”), a hypothetical advisory opinion simi-
lar to LEO 1771, outlines the standard used by the State of Con-
necticut to determine whether an attorney’s conduct was 
“fraudulent.”
201
 Opinion 91-22 deals with (among other rules) 
Connecticut’s counterpart to RPC 1.2(c).
202
 In Opinion 91-22, an 
attorney sought the advice of the Connecticut Bar Association 
Committee on Professional Ethics as to whether the attorney 
could ethically recommend or assist the attorney’s client in trans-
ferring property to the client’s wife when, at the time of the trans-
fers, the client was indebted to a level beyond his ability to repay 
his creditors.
203
 The opinion provides that the attorney may coun-
sel or assist in the conduct if he does not know of any intent to 
deceive and is aware of a substantial purpose other than delaying 
 198. William L. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685–86 (West Publ’g Co., 
4th ed. 1971); see also Glaser v. Enzo Biochern, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 476–77 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted) (applying Virginia law). 
199. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 200. Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 196 (citing Elliot v. Glushon, 390 
F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1967)). 
201. Conn. Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 91-22 (Dec. 5, 1991). 
202. See id. 
203. See id. 
412 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:381 
creditors.
204
 If the lawyer suspects, but does not know, that the 
transfer would be fraudulent, or that there is purpose to deceive, 
the lawyer should give the client the benefit of the doubt.
205
 
In In re Hockett, the Supreme Court of Oregon found similar-
ly—that the attorney had not committed fraud or deceit in a tor-
tious sense.
206
 Instead the court described the attorney’s conduct 
as “intending illegally to put property beyond the lawful claims of 
creditors.”
207
 The court held that the divorces and transfers were 
part of a course of conduct designed to hinder the creditors from 
reaching the debtor’s assets.
208
 Thus, while the attorney had not 
committed the tort of fraud, the court found that the attorney, in 
effecting the fraudulent transfers, possessed the intent to cheat 
the debtor’s creditors and therefore violated the ethical rules.
209
 
Another case illustrative of the differences between a fraudu-
lent transfer and fraud is In re Kenyon.
210
 There, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina held that whether the conduct involved 
met the definition of a “fraudulent conveyance” was not a re-
quirement in the context of the disciplinary proceeding.
211
 Instead, 
the court held that the crux of such a disciplinary decision rests 
in the dishonest nature of the attorneys’ conduct.
212
 
Based on these multijurisdictional opinions, it appears that the 
fact that a fraudulent transfer has been committed within the 
meaning of section 55-80 or section 55-81 does not establish per 
se that an attorney who assisted with the transfer automatically 
violates RPC 1.2(c). Instead, the court or disciplinary committee 
will evaluate the conduct to determine if the accused attorney ad-
vised the client to make the transfer with the purpose of cheating 
or deceiving the creditors.
213
 These decisions reconcile well with 
the definition of “fraudulent,” which the Rules define as “conduct 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. 734 P.2d 877, 882 (Or. 1987). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 881. 
209. See id. at 883–84. 
210. 491 S.E.2d 252, 254 (S.C. 1997) (citation omitted). 
211. Id. 
212. See id. 
213. See supra notes 197–212 and accompanying text. 
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having a purpose to deceive.”
214
 In re Mirabile outlines these con-
cepts well. 
Remember that in In re Mirabile, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri noted that the facts that the Leahys actually had separated 
and abided by the court’s separation order were strong enough 
reasons to overturn the disciplinary committee’s finding of culpa-
bility.
215
 One can assume that the court found that it was just as 
likely that the attorneys assisted in the separation for the pur-
pose of dissolving the marriage as it was that the separation was 
made for the purpose of deceiving Mr. Leahy’s first wife (the cred-
itor). In other cases such as In re Hockett or In re Kenyon, in 
which the attorneys were found to violate the ethical rules, no 
reasonable alternative purposes for the transfers were proffered. 
Thus, it is safe to assume that the conduct in question does not 
have to rise to the level of common law fraud in order to violate 
RPC 1.2(c). However, it is equally clear that just because a lawyer 
assists a client in a transfer that later is avoidable under section 
55-80 or section 55-81 does not mean the attorney automatically 
will be found to be in violation of RPC 1.2(c). It would appear that 
the “fraudulent” element of RPC 1.2(c) requires conduct some-
where in between merely assisting a client with or counseling a 
client to engage in a transfer which is avoidable under section 55-
80 or section 55-81, and an attorney committing an act which 
would create liability for the tortious act of fraud. The questions 
then become: exactly where is the ethical line; and when does a 
lawyer cross it? 
The distinction between present and future creditors will weigh 
heavily on whether or not the attorney’s conduct is “fraudulent” 
as defined by the Rules. As is shown below, the nature of the 
creditor’s claim tends to be central in this analysis. 
b. RPC 1.2(c) and Present Creditors
When a lawyer is confronted with assisting a client in a trans-
fer of assets that will shield those assets from creditors, the ethi-
cal implications of RPC 1.2(c) largely revolve around whether the 
client has any creditors and, if so, whether those creditors are 
214. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
215. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
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present creditors or future creditors.
216
 Virginia case law recog-
nizes the distinction; however, it does not thoroughly define ei-
ther term.
217
 Although modern jurisprudence contains only sparse 
discussion on the issue, courts and ethics advisory committees 
that have considered the question almost unanimously hold that 
assisting a client in effecting a transfer made to hinder, delay, or 
defraud a present creditor is a violation of that state’s equivalent 
of RPC 1.2(c).
218
 
One such example of an ethical violation relating to a fraudu-
lent transfer against present creditors is found in the San Diego 
Bar Association’s Ethics Opinion 1993-1, from the state of Cali-
fornia.
219
 In this opinion, the bar’s Legal Ethics Committee con-
sidered whether an attorney violated the governing ethical rules 
if he advised a client to undertake certain measures to shield the 
client’s assets from claims of existing and identifiable creditors.
220
 
The committee determined such advice would be a violation be-
cause California law treats fraudulent transfers as criminal acts 
and because such a course of conduct would undermine public re-
spect and confidence in the legal profession.
221
 Other cases which 
have been discussed above also support this result. The cases of 
Hockett, Cohen, Kenyon, and Mirabile, as well as Informal Opin-
ion 91-22 and LEO 1771 all involved situations in which a credi-
tor’s existing right to payment had been established.
222
 
Although Virginia law does not provide a clear definition of a 
“present creditor,” a definition can be gleaned from the UFTA. 
The UFTA defines a present creditor as one who had a “claim” 
against the debtor before the debtor made the alleged fraudulent 
transfer.
223
 The UFTA defines a “claim” as “a right to payment, 
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
216. See supra Part III.A. 
217. Harvey v. Fox, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 444, 449 (1834). 
218. See, e.g., In re Kenyon, 491 S.E.2d 252, 256 (S.C. 1997); In re Hockett, 734 P.2d 
877, 882 (Or. 1987). 
 219. San Diego Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 1993-1, available at http: 
//www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion93-1. 
220. Id. 
221. See id. 
222. See supra notes 105–06, 120–24, 169–75, 176–81, 201–03. 
223. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5, 7A, pt. 2 U.L.A. 129 (2006). 
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unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
224
 
Thus, based on the holdings of Virginia’s sister states, it would 
seem that if an attorney assists or counsels a client to engage in a 
transfer for the purpose of avoiding the claims of present credi-
tors, the attorney would violate RPC 1.2(c). The analysis becomes 
less clear outside the context of present creditors. 
c. RPC 1.2(c) and Future Creditors
The difference between present and future creditors is that a 
future creditor’s claim arises after the alleged fraudulent trans-
fer.
225
 In the context of RPC 1.2(c), it is necessary to draw a line 
between foreseeable future creditors and remote future credi-
tors.
226
 A foreseeable future creditor is one that possesses a cog-
nizable connection with the transferor at the time of the trans-
fer.
227
 To illustrate, “a doctor’s pool of patients is comprised of 
future creditors of the doctor, as there is a foreseeable connection, 
but even in this example, the foreseeability will vary for each spe-
cific doctor, as each doctor has a different likelihood of being 
sued.”
228
 Conversely, a remote future creditor is one who acquires 
a claim against the transferor subsequent to the transfer, but the 
claim did not arise out of some pre-existing connection between 
the creditor and the transferor.
229
 The distinction between fore-
seeable future creditors and remote future creditors is relevant to 
a discussion of RPC 1.2(c) because any assistance by an attorney 
in placing a debtor’s assets beyond the reach of the former, as op-
posed to the latter, is much more likely to constitute a violation of 
RPC 1.2(c).
230
 This conclusion is axiomatic given the inherent dif-
ficulties in arguing that a transfer constituted conduct having a 
purpose to deceive a creditor who was wholly unknown and not 
224. Id. § 1, 7A, pt. 2 U.L.A. 14 (2006). 
225. Stein, Violations, supra note 63, at 15. 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. See Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Bar-
field, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulties in concluding culpable intent on the part of 
the transferor where the creditor was unforeseeable at the time of the transfer). 
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foreseeable to either the transferor or the attorney at the time of 
the transfer.
231
 
A South Carolina ethics opinion illustrates the importance of 
the distinction between remote and foreseeable future creditors. 
In Ethics Advisory Opinion 84-02, (“Opinion 84-02”) the South 
Carolina Bar Association’s Ethics Advisory Committee deter-
mined an attorney could transfer a client’s assets to protect the 
client against potential claims of future creditors.
232
 It explained 
that the “critical issue” in analyzing the propriety of the transfer 
was whether there was a reasonable prospect of a judgment 
against the client and, if so, if it was far removed into the distant 
future.
233
 The committee concluded “[i]f . . . there does not exist 
the immediate reasonable prospect of a judgment being entered 
against the client, the transfer merely to avoid the future possi-
bility of an action by a creditor . . . would not be [an ethical viola-
tion].”
234
 
While Opinion 84-02 offers a nice line-in-the-sand rule, its 
holding is called into question by the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., v. Alliance Bond 
Fund, Inc.
235
 Grupo Mexicano “solidified a property owner’s right 
to freely transfer his property prior to judgment subject to subse-
quent equitable remedies under fraudulent conveyance stat-
utes.”
236
 In Grupo Mexicano, a plaintiff-creditor sought a prelimi-
nary injunction against the defendant-debtor to prevent the 
transfer of the defendant’s assets during the trial.
237
 Kleinfeld and 
Alper succinctly summarize the Supreme Court’s holding: 
The Supreme Court stated, “It was well established, however, that, 
as a general rule, a creditor’s bill could be brought only by a creditor 
who had already obtained a judgment establishing the debt.” The 
Court reiterated its understanding of the well-established general 
 231. Id.; see also Kromash, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, § 1.15 to 1.29 (discuss-
ing the implications of future creditor status as it pertains to attorney ethics and asset 
protection). 
 232. S.C. Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 84-02 (1984), availa-
ble at http://www.scbar.org/MemberResources/EthicsAdvisoryOpinions/OpinionView/Artic 
leID/227/Ethics-Advisory-Opinion-84-02.aspx. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. See 527 U.S. 308, 319–21 (1999). 
236. See Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 196, at 26. 
237. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 310; see also Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra 
note 196, at 26. 
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rule, “that a judgment establishing the debt was necessary before a 
court of equity would interfere with the debtor’s use of his proper-
ty.” In other words, under common law a creditor has no property in-
terest in the assets of a debtor prior to the creditor obtaining a 
judgment, and before judgment, a debtor’s property is freely aliena-
ble. 
The point is that all people, even potential debtors, have funda-
mental rights to protect and control their property. The transfer of 
freely alienable property is not unlawful and cannot be restrained by 
a creditor, absent obtaining remedies allowed under other statutory 
law such as bankruptcy, even if the transfer could subsequently be 
challenged under fraudulent transfer statutes.
238
The Supreme Court’s decision seems to be at odds with the 
holdings of Ethics Opinion 84-02, which provides that it consti-
tutes an ethical violation for an attorney to counsel a client to en-
gage or assist a client with a fraudulent transfer for the purpose 
of avoiding foreseeable future creditors.
239
 Certainly, if the Su-
preme Court has stated that it is the right of all people to control 
their assets, absent an adverse right to those assets in the form of 
a judgment or pre-existing claim,
240
 then it would be unjust to 
punish lawyers who help individuals to exercise this right. When 
examined in the context of the Rules’ definition of the term 
fraudulent (“having the purpose to deceive”), the same result is 
reached.
241
 How can a lawful transfer of property, which the at-
torney’s client has the sole right to control, be considered deceit-
ful? 
The authors submit that this question can be answered by ex-
amining the context in which the Supreme Court made their de-
cision in Grupo Mexicano. First and foremost, the case involved a 
prayer for a preliminary injunction.
242
 The Court’s decision was 
founded in the idea that  
[t]he rule requiring a judgment [before attachment would be al-
lowed] was a product, not just of the procedural requirements that 
remedies at law had to be exhausted before equitable remedies could 
be pursued, but also of the substantive rule that a general creditor 
 238. Kleinfeld, Florida Supreme Court, supra note 196, at 26 (quoting Grupo Mexicano, 
527 U.S. at 319–21). 
239. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text. 
240. See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319. 
241. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
242. Groupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 310. 
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(one without a judgment) had no cognizable interest, either at law or 
in equity, in the property of his debtor, and therefore, could not in-
terfere with the debtor’s use of that property.
243
This is consistent with the classification of fraudulent transfer 
statutes as remedial, and not preemptive, tools. Thus, despite the 
fact a debtor may have every right to make a transfer, a lawyer 
who assists a client with the same transfer can be held culpable 
under RPC 1.2(c) if the purpose of the transfer was to deceive 
creditors.
244
 While this analysis may seem counterintuitive, it 
must be remembered that an attorney’s ethical obligations may 
be more restrictive on an attorney’s conduct than the client’s 
“bare legal rights.”  Phrased alternatively, just because an attor-
ney’s client has a legal right to pursue a particular course of con-
duct, it does not necessarily follow that the attorney would be act-
ing ethically if the attorney stood solely on the client’s right.  For 
example, an attorney is prohibited under the ethics rules from di-
rectly contacting an adverse party who is represented by coun-
sel—despite that the client has the legal right to directly reach 
out to the adverse party for settlement or any other purposes.
245
 
4. Summary
Certainly, a Virginia lawyer may engage in asset protection 
planning—one would be hard-pressed to argue, for example, that 
a lawyer cannot advise clients who desire to start a real estate 
investment business that they should utilize a limited liability 
company versus a general partnership business structure.
246
 Or, 
that a surgeon not protect her assets from the threat of a mal-
practice suit by placing those assets in a trust, or by owning the 
assets as tenants by the entirety with her husband. On the other 
hand, one would be equally hard-pressed to argue that the attor-
neys’ behavior in the In re Hockett or Cohen cases examined 
above was ethically proper. 
 243. Rothschild, Ethical?, supra note 197, at 44 (quoting Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 
319–20) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
244. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
245. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 4.2 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
 246. See Gideon Rothschild & Daniel S. Rubin, Asset Protection Planning, 810-3D TAX 
MANAGEMENT, at A-8 (2011) (explaining that a more significant question is whether a par-
ticular fraudulent transfer has a substantial purpose other than to delay or burden third 
parties). 
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As is often the case, the difficulties arise in the middle ground, 
in the situations where there is not a clear violation. This essay 
outlines what an attorney must do in order to violate RPC 1.2(c). 
First, he must act with the requisite mens rea. In the context of 
RPC 1.2(c), the applicable mens rea is defined by the term “know-
ingly.” The Rules define “knowingly” as having actual knowledge 
of the facts in question.
247
 This actual knowledge can be proven by 
circumstantial evidence, and the result will vary from case to 
case.
248
 Some jurisdictions seem to apply a reasonable person 
standard,
249
 while others seem to focus on whether there was a 
non-fraudulent explanation for the transfer.
250
 
Secondly, in order to be found in violation of RPC 1.2(c) the at-
torney’s conduct must consist of counseling a client to engage in, 
or assisting a client with the allegedly fraudulent transfer.
251
 This 
requirement is the clearest of the three. On one hand, it is not on-
ly ethically proper, but professionally expected, that a lawyer will 
advise a client of the legal consequences of a proposed transfer. 
On the other hand, an attorney clearly cannot assist the client in 
effecting a transfer in violation of RPC 1.2(c). This forbidden as-
sistance includes becoming a party to the transfer,
252
 or simply 
preparing and filing documents.
253
 Furthermore, an attorney can-
not step back from actually assisting in the transfer only to in-
struct a client to engage in the forbidden conduct. This situation 
has not been examined in any available cases, disciplinary hear-
ings, or opinions, most likely because the proof required to find a 
violation would be very difficult to obtain. 
Finally, the transfer at issue must qualify as “fraudulent.”
254
 As 
noted, the Rules provide a unique definition of the word.
255
 Many 
courts and scholarly sources agree that a lawyer will not run 
afoul of the ethical rules simply because he or she effects a trans-
fer which is later held to be avoidable under section 55-80 or sec-
247. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble: Terminology (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
248. Id. 
249. See Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908 So.2d 405, 411 (Fla. 2005). 
250. See In re Mirabile, 975 S.E.2d 936, 940–41 (Mo. 1998). 
251. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
252. See supra notes 176–86 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
255. Id. 
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tion 55-81.
256
 The same courts and scholars agree that the conduct 
does not have to equate to common law fraud.
257
 Again the line is 
somewhere in the gray area. This ethical line is illuminated 
slightly by examining the differences between present, future 
foreseeable, and future remote creditors. If the “knowingly” re-
quirement is met, an attorney’s assistance in a transfer to avoid a 
client’s present creditors most likely will be fraudulent and thus a 
violation of RPC 1.2(c).
258
 On the other end of the spectrum, if a 
lawyer knowingly assists a client in transferring assets outside of 
the reach of future remote creditors, he most likely will not be 
found in violation of RPC 1.2(c).
259
 Therefore, once again, the ethi-
cal line is in the middle ground, accompanied by the class of indi-
viduals known as foreseeable future creditors. 
The final section strives to provide guidance as to how a Virgin-
ia practitioner can avoid running afoul of RPC 1.2(c) in unclear 
situations, such as those in which foreseeable future creditors are 
involved. 
V.  GUIDANCE 
In the context of asset protection planning, the truism “with 
great power comes great responsibility” holds fast. Lawyers as-
sisting clients with asset protection planning have great power to 
shield clients’ assets from creditors, thereby providing peace of 
mind and long-term financial security. However lawyers, as offic-
ers of the court, also have a great responsibility not only to their 
clients, but also to the judicial system and society as a whole to 
act within the bounds of the law and comply with ethical stand-
ards provided by the profession.
260
 
In order for a lawyer to avoid an ethical breach when assisting 
a client with a transfer of the client’s assets, she should ensure 
that the transfer is not being made for the purpose of deceiving 
creditors. One scholar suggests that a lawyer should become fully 
informed of the client’s standing vis-à-vis present creditors as a 
256. See supra Part IV.A.3.a. 
257. Id. 
258. See supra Part IV.A.3.b. 
259. See supra Part III.A.3.c. 
260. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble (Repl. Vol. 2012); In re Giffiths, 413 U.S. 
717, 724 n.14 (1973). 
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part of the lawyer’s due diligence.
261
 Due diligence in this context 
means “the attorney should independently investigate the client’s 
financial and legal affairs, including an analysis of the client’s 
solvency.”
262
 This also would include “attempt[ing] to uncover any 
existing, foreseeable or threatened claims.”
263
  
Several scholarly sources have offered practical guidance on 
ways to perform this due diligence, and steps attorneys can take 
to avoid disciplinary sanctions arising from their involvement 
with possibly fraudulent transfers. First, “counsel may wish to 
obtain from his prospective client an affidavit reciting that the 
client will not be rendered insolvent by the contemplated transfer 
and that the elements inherent in the [jurisdiction’s fraudulent 
transfer statute] are not present in the client’s case.”
264
 Similarly, 
an attorney may ask a client to fill out a questionnaire pertaining 
to the reasons the client is effecting the transaction.
265
 Further-
more, in addition to RPC 1.2(c) and the guidance set forth above, 
an attorney must be mindful of Virginia Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.16 (“RPC 1.16”).
266
 RPC 1.16, similar to Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.16,
267
 dictates that an attorney who learns 
of a client’s wrongful conveyances and cannot persuade the client 
to disclose those transfers should consider withdrawing from rep-
resentation.
268
 If the attorney is able to convince her client to re-
veal the transfers to the court, counsel also should make a good 
faith effort to recover any amounts already transferred as a result 
of fraudulent conveyances.
269
 
While the above guidance is well-intentioned and may indeed 
provide for the appropriate actions in an ideal world, the authors 
contend that such steps are not practical in the everyday practice 
 261. Kromash, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at § 1.41 (explaining that, in re-
gards to a lawyer’s ethical obligations when assisting a client in the transfer of assets, “it 
is imperative for the attorney to conduct due diligence with respect to the client’s legal and 
financial situation”). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Jerome Ostrov, Tax & Estate Planning with Real Estate, Partnerships & LLCs, § 
11:8 (2d ed. 2010). 
265. Id. 
266. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.16 (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
267. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (1980). 
268. See Adrienne O’Connell McNamara & Carl A. Eklund, Ethical Quandaries of a 
Debtor’s Lawyer, in REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES 243, 273 (Practising Law 
Inst. 1993). 
269. Id. at 272. 
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of law. Furthermore, the language of the Rules disincentivizes 
such actions. RPC 1.2(c)—specifically the “knowingly” require-
ment contained therein and examined in Section IV.A.1 above— 
may have the effect of creating an “ostrich approach,” whereby at-
torneys are encouraged to “stick their heads in the sand” as it re-
lates to the financial standing of their clients. For example, it is 
well-established that a lawyer can rely on statements made by 
his clients.
270
 Why then would an attorney dig any deeper into a 
client’s financial standing than the client initially provides? Not 
only would this serve to frustrate or possibly anger clients, but it 
would also expose the lawyer to a potential RPC 1.2(c) violation. 
While a thorough analysis of the changes that could or should be 
made to the Rules in order to curb this temptation is beyond the 
scope of this essay, it is one the Virginia State Bar’s Legal Ethics 
Committee should consider undertaking in the near future. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The object of this essay is to illuminate the line between ethical 
asset protection strategies and unethical transfers. Although 
fraudulent transfer law is, in many ways, the flip side of the asset 
protection coin, these competing concepts are more than a distinc-
tion without a difference. The legal difference between the two 
may, at times, be blurry at best. Nonetheless, an attorney can 
make a reliable prediction as to the legal propriety of a client’s 
asset protection goals through an analysis of a client’s creditor 
situation, the badges of fraud surrounding a proposed transfer, 
and a client’s financial circumstances. 
In terms of the ethical difference, the contentious relationship 
between (i) a lawyer’s duty to zealously represent his or her cli-
ents, (ii) a lawyer’s duty to abide by the ethical rules, (iii) the 
amorphous nature of the Rules’ terminology, and (iv) the lack of 
Virginia precedent creates a situation in which a bright line rule 
is impossible to nail down. Admittedly, this essay may raise more 
questions than it provides answers. However, it is the authors’ 
hope that at the very least, this essay has defined the ethical 
boundaries of asset protection work and fraudulent transfer law. 
The authors attempted, through this essay, to illuminate gray ar-
eas—situations in which it would be wise for lawyers to take the 
additional steps outlined in Section V. Finally, it is the authors’ 
270. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 
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sincere hope that this essay identifies those sections of the Rules 
of which the Virginia State Bar’s Legal Ethics Committee can 
provide further guidance or refinement to ensure that Virginia 
practitioners not only will know there is an ethical distinction 
and difference between asset protection planning and fraudulent 
transfers, but also be able to clearly identify the difference. 
